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The history of the research with the highly
pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1
and the publication of the results of that
research is reminiscent of the Buddhist
“Parable of the Blind Men and the Ele-
phant.” In the parable, the Buddha relates a
story of a raja who, when confronted with
disputatious scholars, gathered blind men
and presented each man with a part of an
elephant, telling him “here is an elephant.”
The raja then asked each man to describe
the animal. As each man explained “what
sort of thing is an elephant,” the men began
arguing about whether the likeness was to
a pot or a basket or a pillar, etcetera, even-
tually coming to blows over the question
and prompting the Buddha to observe:“for,
quarreling, each to his view they cling. Such
folk see only one side of a thing”1. Fortu-
nately, the H5N1 debates have not led to
blows but instead have yielded important
provocative discussions about the impor-
tance of the research and the issues and
implications of communicating the results
of the research (1). Unfortunately, there
still is no consensus regarding the manner
of the oversight of life-sciences dual-use
research of concern (DURC).
In the fall of 2011, the National Science
Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), a
United States Government Advisory Com-
mittee, was charged with reviewing two
manuscripts describing research funded
by the National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases (NIAID) in which
genetically modified H5N1 was shown to
have the potential for respiratory transmis-
sion between ferrets. The primary author
of the manuscript intended for publication
in Nature was Yoshihiro Kawaoka, Ph.D.,
DVM, of the University of Wisconsin-
Madison and the University of Tokyo;
the primary author of the manuscript
intended for publication inScience was Ron
A.M. Fouchier, Ph.D. of the Erasmus Med-
ical Center in Rotterdam. The mandate
was the result of the manuscripts having
been shown to the White House National
Security Staff, which referred its concerns
that the publication of the manuscripts
might have biosecurity implications to the
Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, which in turn asked the NSABB for
its recommendations.
The NSABB formed an H5N1 Work-
ing Group. The Working Group and the
Board spent hundreds of hours discussing
the issues presented by and swirling around
the manuscripts, all of which conversa-
tions and meetings were closed due to
the very nature of the purpose for which
the NSABB had been convened, i.e., biose-
curity concerns posed by the publication
of the manuscripts as well as the inter-
ests of the authors and publishers that the
manuscripts not be made public prema-
turely. On December 20, 2011, the NSABB
announced its recommendation that the
authors’ “general conclusions highlighting
the novel outcome be published but that
the manuscripts not include the method-
ological and other details that could enable
replication of the experiments by those
who would seek to do harm” (2).
Subsequently, the authors’ revised man-
uscripts were submitted to the NSABB and
discussed at a meeting on March 29 and 30,
2012. This assembly included the perspec-
tives of the governments of the Kingdom
of the Netherlands and Japan2 and from
meetings sponsored by the World Health
Organization and the American Society
for Microbiology. Additionally, the“United
States Government Policy for Oversight of
Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Con-
cern” was issued at the end of the first
day of the 11/2-day conference (3). After
a robust debate among its voting and ex
officio members, which ex officio mem-
bership included NIAID’s director, the
NSABB unanimously recommended that
the revised Kawaoka manuscript should
be “communicated in full” (4). It also
recommended, but in a 12-to-6 decision,
“the communication of the data, methods,
and conclusions presented in [the] revised
Fouchier manuscript”3.
The NSABB path of H5N1 review was
to varying degrees rocky from beginning
to end. Some of the confusion could have
been avoided; some of the commotion
could not have been escaped. Pertinent
1The Udana 68–69.
2Other countries expressed their apprehensions about a precedent that the H5N1 research results would not be shared with them although it was they who had shared
samples of those viruses with the researchers.
3The author was one of the six members who did not concur with the majority’s recommendation with reference to the Fouchier manuscript.
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questions include why the process was dis-
ordered, how confusion could have been
or be avoided and whether another mech-
anism should replace that of the NSABB.
The NIAID-funded studies undoubt-
edly should have been highlighted for
biosecurity concerns well before the results
of the H5N1 research were being read-
ied for publication. Questions whether
the research might have the potential to
be DURC should have been considered
during the design, execution, and reviews
of the research, and there should have
been in place a communication plan given
the potential for novel results. From early
on, the research clearly was within the
seven categories of experiments that could
constitute DURC and warrant particular
scrutiny according to the 2004 National
Research Council report Biotechnology
Research in an Age of Terrorism (5) and
the 2007 NSABB report Proposed Frame-
work for the Oversight of Dual Use Life
Sciences Research (6). As a consequence
of this failure, much of the NSABB dis-
cussion centered around the potential for
the research to be used for malevolent
purposes – the nature and results of the
research, its complexity in terms of how
readily the research could be replicated, by
whom it could be reproduced and made
more dangerous, what facilities and what
conditions would be necessary, and how
it could be disseminated – and a crucial
question of whether the benefits for public
health outweighed the risks.
As noted, the manuscripts necessar-
ily were kept confidential because of the
biosecurity concerns and the interests of
the authors and publishers, but before
the review of the revised manuscripts,
the Dutch government invoked European
export-control legislation as well. The
secrecy surrounding this review process led
to various ill-founded assumptions, mis-
understandings, commentaries by individ-
uals who did not know how the matter
came to the NSABB and/or would not
have read the manuscripts, leaks – some
of which were not accurate reflections of
the discussions, and reporting errors, all
of which harmed the NSABB’s credibility
despite the NSABB lacking the ability to
respond without violating the confidential-
ity to which its members were sworn. Some
kind of equilibrium between transparency
and consensus versus security thus was an
important issue for the NSABB when dis-
cussing how and to whom the results of the
H5N1 research could be communicated,
but a satisfactory balance, while ardently
sought by the NSABB, was not found.
Ultimately, the NSABB proved not to be
an exemplary model and instead showed
that a new, autonomous advisory com-
mission must be created as its substitute.
The better practical model would have two
components: requirements for the federal
funding agency and for a federally funded
researcher and institution, and a Presiden-
tial Commission for the Oversight of Dual
Use Life Sciences Research established by
an Executive Order.
The first element would be fivefold: (a)
a requirement that the federal departments
and agencies have personnel with suffi-
cient expertise to screen research proposals
for DURC potential with the concomitant
requirement that if such potential exists,
the researcher be asked to consider modify-
ing the research to reduce risk; (b) a means
to make sure that the facilities are adequate
that the researcher and laboratory staff
are knowledgeable about DURC issues and
engage in a continuing review to minimize
any necessary risk, and that the institution
has a communication plan regarding novel
techniques and/or novel results; (c) the
mandatory education of each researcher in
biosecurity in conjunction with biosafety
for the purpose of recognizing and address-
ing DURC issues; (d) the requirement that
the researcher attest to a review of the
research for DURC potential at the begin-
ning and on each occasion of a funder’s
review; and (e) the requirement that each
institution have a committee that includes
the institution’s responsible official, addi-
tional experts and community members to
review the conduct of research identified as
having DURC potential.
The second element would be the cre-
ation of a Presidential Commission to serve
as a truly independent expert advisory
group. Its voting membership would be
appointed and include individuals nomi-
nated by the federal departments and agen-
cies that conduct, support, or have inter-
ests in life-sciences research, including the
intelligence community, so as to be com-
prised of persons reflecting a diversity of
scientific and other relevant expertise and
interests, including that of the public, in
order to provide divergent perspectives.
The Commission would have a staff and
budget separate from any federal depart-
ment or agency, and it would be able
to convene itself and set its own agenda.
Its members would have access to secu-
rity information, and it would be able to
call upon experts from outside govern-
ment. Ex officio members would repre-
sent the interested federal departments and
agencies with the caveat that the depart-
ment or agency that funded the research
would be limited in participation in any
discussion of that research because of the
inherent conflict of interest possessed by
a department’s or agency’s stake in pro-
moting the communication of research
that it has found sufficiently important to
fund.
The Commission would be the author-
itative voice to the United States Govern-
ment. Federal departments and agencies
would be expected to refer to its exper-
tise in decisions whether to fund research
identified as potential DURC at the out-
set and during continuing reviews; by
this means, the Commission could pro-
vide needed consistency and integrated
approaches among the departments and
agencies. The Commission also would be
available to an institution, whose DURC-
review committee refers queries to it, and
it also would be available to the editors and
publishers of scientific journals who now
by default are the arbiters of whether and
what data and analyses are published. As
would be true of the institutional com-
mittee, the Commission’s responsibilities
would not be unduly burdensome because
as a practical matter, very little scientific
research constitutes DURC.
Additionally, the Commission should
undertake other duties: provide educa-
tional materials to institutions and vigor-
ously promote their use; propose federal
standards for personnel reliability; recom-
mend approaches regarding the commu-
nication of the results of DURC research
along the continuum of full disclosure
to government classification, including
restricted access; and undertake a review
of the plethora of the federal statutes, reg-
ulations, rules, guidelines, and policies for
the purpose of organizing the existing reg-
ulatory cacophony, which jumble burdens
and discourages scientific research.
As a general, undisputed principle, the
unrestricted dissemination of the results
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of scientific research is critical for the
progress of science. When this must be
compromised for reasons of national secu-
rity, there has to be a means by which
the results can be shared with trusted
and responsible researchers and institu-
tions. Among the unresolved issues, how-
ever, is who is responsible for the decision?
Should the Commission’s guidance control
the agency’s or department’s funding deci-
sion subject to an appeal to the Cabinet-
level officer or the National Security Coun-
cil? By what mechanism will compliance
be enforced? The circumstances of the
publication of the results of the H5N1
research will be repeated in a multitude
of circumstances, e.g., ongoing gain-of-
function research with highly pathogenic
avian influenza viruses, a new botulinum
toxin serotype. Only from an increas-
ing mindfulness of biosecurity issues and
DURC, in particular, will come a legitimate
approach – and a legitimate approach must
be found – to safeguarding public health,
safety, and security without compromis-
ing the essential vitality of the scientific
enterprise.
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